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Science and Morality: Pragmatic Reflections on
Rorty's "Pragmatism"
Brian Leitert

"Pragmatism," says Richard Rorty, "puts natural science on all
fours with politics and art. It is one more source of suggestions about
what to do with our lives."' Some self-professed pragmatists, like the
American philosopher WV.O. Quine, would obviously deny this. I
shall not engage in a proprietary dispute here about the label "pragmatism,"' but I do want to present a kind of pragmatic challenge to
the idea that we have reason to think "science [is] on all fours with
politics and art."
Let us start with a familiar distinction between questions of
"theoretical reason" (questions about what we ought to believe) and
questions of "practical reason" (questions about what we ought to do).
Ethics, politics, and, on some views, art address what we ought to do
("what to do with our lives," as Rorty puts it); science, insofar as we
credit its deliverances, tells us what we ought to believe. When Mendelian genetics supplied the causal mechanism explaining the truth of
Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, it did not tell us
"what to do with our lives." But when Herbert Spencer and other social Darwinists interpreted Darwin's theory metaphorically as describing patterns of wealth distribution in society, it did entail a practical
conclusion: the socioeconomically "weak" ought to be allowed to perish, as they are not "fit" enough to survive in the marketplace. Unfortunately for the Social Darwinist apologists, for man-made inequities
there was no genetic mechanism to support their story. Like Rorty,
t Hines H. Baker and Thelma Kelley Baker Chair in Law, Professor of Philosophy, and
Director of the Law & Philosophy Program, The University of Texas at Austin. Thanks to Eric
Posner and Richard Posner for comments on an earlier draft.
I

Richard Rorty, Dewey and Posner on Pragmatism and Moral Progress,74 U Chi L Rev

915,916 (2007).
2
See generally Brian Leiter, Why Quine is Not a Postmodernist,in Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence:Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy 137

(Oxford 2007) (arguing that for Quine, science can't be entirely justified by philosophy, but it
nonetheless corresponds with more accurate and reliable predictions of future experience).
3 As a point of personal privilege as a Nietzsche scholar, I do want to observe that Rorty's
claims about Nietzsche's "vacillations" about truth and science at the start of his essay betray
either an ignorance of or indifference to both Nietzsche's texts and Nietzsche scholarship. See
Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality 159-61 (Routledge 2002). See generally Maudemarie Clark,
Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge 1990).
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however, they seemed to think that "science" was "on all fours with
politics," that is, with "suggestions about what to do with our lives."
To be sure, scientists-from Albert Einstein to Noam Chomskyhave had views about "what to do with our [collective] lives," but their
practical claims are conceptually severable from their claims about
what we ought to believe about how things are, whether it is the nature of time or the fundamental syntactic structure of all human languages. If science is "on all fours" with morals and politics, it can not
possibly be because both involve "suggestions about what to do with
our lives."4
Let us consider, then, two other formulations of what appears to
be Rorty's central metaphor of morals and politics being "on all fours"
with natural science. Rorty accepts that "reasoning in morals is no
different than reasoning in science,"' and notes that moral propositions-for example, statements about the "cruelty" of certain punishments-"are true, on a pragmatist view, in just the same way that it is
true that E = mc2., These claims, at first blush, seem as incredible as
the first version of Rorty's thesis we examined. If reasoning in morals
were no different than reasoning in science, how to explain then the
fact that almost everyone partakes in the former, while the latter is the
privilege of a highly trained elite? Surely there must be some differences in what kinds of reasons count as reasons that would explain
this remarkable division of epistemic labor?
And we needn't know much about science, or morals, to notice
the differences. It is not simply that reasoning in science often turns on
mathematical reasoning that is almost entirely foreign to moral argument-outside certain largely irrelevant academic research programs
in deontic logic. It is, more centrally, that the justification of (most)
scientific propositions turns on their predictive, empirical success' and
that when they are in fact deemed successful they are thought to have
illuminated some aspect of the causal structure of the world. But the
justification of moral claims turns neither on their empirical predictive
6

4
One of the things we "do with our lives," admittedly, is try to understand what the world
is like, but that is not a "suggestion[" that emerges from science.
5 Rorty, 74 U Chi L Rev at 922 (cited in note 1).
6
Id.
' What counts as empirical success is itself subject to various epistemic constraints having
to do with replicability, controlling for extraneous factors, and the like.
8 On the centrality of causation to understanding what it is scientific theories do in ex-

plaining phenomena, see Nancy Cartwright, From Causation to Explanation and Back, in Brian
Leiter, ed, The Future for Philosophy 230, 232-37 (Oxford 2004).

HeinOnline -- 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 930 2007

2007]1

PragmaticReflections on Rorty's "Pragmatism"

931

success, nor their illuminating the causal structure of the world! One
justifies, for example, the claim that eating meat is morally wrong by
appealing to a principle thought to be intuitively (not empirically!)
plausible, like "unnecessary suffering is morally wrong," conjoined
with empirical claims, like "animals are sentient creatures capable of
suffering" and "the way animals are raised and killed in preparing
meat causes them unnecessary suffering." This kind of argument licenses (and depends on) no empirical predictions and illuminates
nought about the causal structure of the world. By contrast, we now
accept that a scientific proposition like E = mc' is true, contra Rorty,
not for the kinds of reasons offered against the morality of eating
meat, but because the mass-energy equivalence Einstein proposed was
experimentally confirmed (the first time was in 1932 by J.D. Cockcroft
and E.T.S. Walton"o).
Richard Rorty, a gifted and remarkably learned philosopher, surely
knows all this, so what might he be thinking in claiming a methodological equivalence between morality and science? Curiously, it seems his
contention must really depend on a distinctly unpragmatic philosophical thesis that abstracts away from the actualpractices of justification in
ethics and science that we have reviewed above. For, according to
Rorty-purveyor, he says, of "the true pragmatist faith"""[p]ragmatists substitute the question'which descriptions of the human
the question
situation are most useful for which human purposes?' for
12
'which descriptions tells us what that situation really is?"'
But now we may frame the challenge to the Rortian pragmatist
starkly: why think any "human purposes" are actually served by sub-

stituting the purported pragmatic criterion "useful for . .. human pur-

poses" for the actual and quite different criteria that the genuine practitioners of morals and law and science employ in trying to figure out
what the moral, legal, and scientific "situation really is"? Pragmatism,

9 Recently, some moral philosophers have thought the objective reality of moral claims (if
not their status qua moral) is vindicated by their explanatory and causal power, though none of
them have made good on these claims. For a critical discussion of this proposal, see generally
Brian Leiter, Moral Facts and Best Explanations, in Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence 203 (cited

in note 2).

10 J.D. Cockcroft and E.TS. Walton, Experiments with High Velocity Positive Ions: II-The
Disintegration of Elements by High Velocity Protons, 137 Proceedings Royal Socy London Series

B Papers Math & Phys Character 229,236-37 (1932).
11 Rorty, 74 U Chi L Rev at 918 (cited in note 1) (arguing that Posner's rejection of the
idea that society has made moral progress represents a relapse from true pragmatism into "positivistic science worship").
12 Id at 916 (describing how pragmatists treat all metaphysical disputes as being "irrelevant
to practice and thus not worth discussing").
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qua philosophical thesis, seems to want to trump the actual practice of
those whose intellectual inquiries it would interpret-and that seems
an "unpragmatic" thing to do! Could it not be that trying to "figure
out what the situation really is" is a better epistemic goal for inquiries
that, in the end, serve human purposes?
Since the scientific revolution transformed the epistemological
landscape of the world starting several hundred years ago, a loose set
of epistemic norms (norms for what we ought to believe as true) has
permeated all aspects of human culture. At its core it holds that we
should believe in the existence only of that which figures in the best
causal explanation of our sense experience, a norm that has taken
hold in fields ranging from theoretical physics to evolutionary biology.
What constitutes a relevant causal explanation or sensory experience
is a matter of ongoing contention among scientists and philosophers.
The details do not matter for our purposes here. What matters is that
we may take the human practice of science to be organized around a
norm-a "social norm" as Rorty would say-to the effect, "We ought
to deem actual only that which figures in the best causal explanation
of what we can perceive." Let us call it "the Scientific Norm." That
norm is vindicated, as it were, by its practical success: it works! Indeed,
it works so well that it now dominates all the systematic inquiries of
human beings, from physics to psychology. That is the truth in pragmatism-the epistemic norms that help us cope are the ones on which we
now rely-but it is a truth obscured by Rorty's promiscuous version of
the doctrine, which confuses the criteria for relying on particular epistemic norms (namely, that they work for human purposes) with the
content of the norms themselves (most of which make no reference to
human purposes, but rather criteria like causal or explanatory power).
Consider this telling passage from Rorty:
In the sixteenth century it was only rational to test astrophysical
or biological theories against holy scripture. We can rightly claim
to be more rational than Copernicus's contemporaries, if that
means simply that our beliefs about what to test against whatand, more generally, for what is relevant to what-are true,
whereas many of theirs were false. Our social norms are indeed
better than their social norms. But there is no discipline called
"epistemology" that can show this to be the case. Our judgments

13

See generally Cartwright, From Causation to Explanation and Back (cited in note
8).
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of progress and of rationality will remain as parochial as our
judgments of everything else.14
What it is reasonableto do is, of course, relative to the existing norms
of rationality, so Rorty is correct that it could have been rational five
hundred years ago to test empirical hypotheses against scripture. And
so, too, our judgment of what it is reasonable to believe now is a
judgment made relative to our current norms of rationality, norms that
triumphed, more or less, with the scientific revolution. But these
norms triumphed for practical reasons; that is, they worked in a way
that hypotheses based on scripture did not. Aeronautical engineers
take seriously the Scientific Norm in designing airplanes, but they do
not pay much heed to scripture, at least during their day job. Does a
"discipline called 'epistemology' show this to be the case"? Not if
what Rorty means is a discipline that stands outside history to tell us
which epistemic norms deserve our allegiance. But if epistemology
means, as pragmatists like Quine would have it," the discipline that
describes the norms that figure in successful inquiries, then epistemology does tell us something very important: it tells us that the Scientific
Norm undergirds all those inquiries which have had the most dramatic
results for human purposes by transforming our world over the last
several centuries.
We may see how Rorty's "pragmatism," as he calls it, goes wrong
by recalling the most evocative metaphor in the pragmatist genre,
"Neurath's boat," an image due to the logical positivist Otto Neurath
but made famous in post-WWII philosophy by the American pragmatist Quine.16 Neurath (and Quine) analogized our epistemological
situation to that of sailors at sea who must rebuild the boat in which
they sail. Being afloat, they cannot abandon the ship and rebuild it
from scratch, so they must choose to stand firm on certain planks of
the ship while rebuilding others. They, of course, choose to "stand
firm" on those planks that are the most sturdy and reliable-the ones
that "work" the best-though there may come a point when the sailors will tear those up too and replace them with new ones.
Our epistemological situation, on this Quinean pragmatic view, is
the same. In figuring out what we ought to believe, we necessarily
"stand firm" on certain epistemic "planks" in our best-going theory of
the world, the one that, to date, has worked the best. To be sure, we
14

15
16

Rorty, 74 U Chi L Rev at 925 (cited in note 1).
See Leiter, Why Quine is Not a Postmodernist at 145 (cited in note 2).
See W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object 3,123-24 (MIT 1960).
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cannot rule out that we may one day want to replace those planks
too-just as our predecessors replaced planks like "the truth is what
the Good Book says" and "Newtonian mechanics describes the laws
governing all matter"-but that is just to renounce absolute certainty
and accept fallibilism as fundamental to our epistemological situation.
Where the Neurath/Quine picture agrees with Rorty is that all
our epistemic judgments are "parochial," but only in the fairly trivial
sense that it is conceptually (hence practically) impossible for us to
climb out of our ship (our best-going theory of the world) and rebuild
the whole edifice from scratch by reference to nonparochial (nonhistorical) standards of truth and warrant. (On Quine's view, "there is no
Archimedean point of cosmic exile from which to leverage our theory
of the world."") We must necessarily rely on certain epistemic criteria-criteria for what we ought to believe-any time we ask about the
justification of any other belief (including beliefs about epistemic criteria). That is just to say that we must stand firm on certain "planks" in
the boat while rebuilding (or figuring out whether we ought to rebuild) any other planks. The only question, then, is which planks we
ought to "stand firm" on because they work so well.
One such plank seems rather clearly to be the Scientific Norm.
Rorty, however, would have us get out of the "boat" we're currently in,
the one in which the Scientific Norm has been perhaps the firmest
plank on which we stand, and board a different boat in which "most
useful for human purposes" is the governing norm. But there is no
pragmatic reason to do that, and Rorty gives us none, or at least none
that is convincing.
Now Rorty does sometimes write as though, in terms of practical
success, science and morals are on a par. He says, for example, "We
have been equally successful in both morals and physics. To be sure,
we have more difficulty convincing people of our moral views than of
our scientific views, but this does not mean that the two differ in something called 'epistemic status.'"" Yet what could count as the evidence of
"equal success" in morals and physics that Rorty has in mind? It can't
be that those who try to violate the laws of physics end up frustrated,
maimed, or dead, while those who violate the moral law (however it is
understood) suffer no predictable set of consequences at all. It can't be
that Nazi scientists and Manhattan Project scientists were interested in
17 Roger F Gibson, Willard Van Orman Quine, in Jaegwon
Kim and Ernest Sosa, eds, A
Companionto Metaphysics 426,427 (Blackwell 1995). See also Peter Hylton, Quine's Naturalism,
19 Midwest Stud in Phil 261,265 (1994).
18
Rorty, 74 U Chi L Rev at 920 (cited in note 1).
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the same physics, but had rather different morals and politics. It can't be
that the academic community in physics is global, transcending culture
and nationality, while most moral debate is parochial in the worst sense
of that term, that is, tracking the interests and horizons of particular
classes, cultural traditions, and experiences.
Rorty objects, however, that "brute facts about the presence or
absence of consensus-whether about planetary orbits or about sodomy-are to be explained sociologically rather than epistemologically."'9 For this to be persuasive, however, we would need to hear the
details about how the actual sociological explanation goes, and Rorty,
alas, never offers any. About the only explanatorily relevant psychosocial factor in the offing is that humans everywhere share an interest in
predicting the future course of their experience, but that simply explains why the Scientific Norm works for human purposes, and why
Nazis and social democrats share the same physics, but not the same
morals. But that is a "sociological" explanation that simply underlines
the fundamental difference between morals and science.
Rorty's response to Judge Posner's moral skepticism, then, rings
hollow: "When Posner argues that moral philosophy is 'epistemically
feeble' on the ground that 'the criteria for pronouncing a moral claim
valid are given by the culture in which the claim is advanced,'
Kuhnians like myself reply that the same argument would show the
epistemic feebleness of physics and biology."20 But Kuhn never
claimed anything of the kind about physics or biology, and Rorty
never gives us the details of how the allegedly Kuhn-inspired cultural
explanation for physics and biology would go. Rorty's conjecture as to
Dewey's reply to Judge Posner's skepticism about moral progress is
equally unconvincing: "Of course our judgment of our own rightness
is provincial. So are all our judgments about anything. But why should
the fact that we use the criteria of our time and place to judge that we
have made progress cast doubt on that judgment? What other criteria
are available?"" The "other criteria" available are precisely the criteria of "our time and place"-the criteria reflected in the planks on
which we presently "stand firm" -which suggest that moral judgments
are "epistemically feeble" (hostage to class interest and cultural bias) in

19
20
21

Id at 921.
Id at 921.
Id at 920
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a way that scientific judgments (generally) are not.' Rorty claims that
Dewey thought "that the contingency of our moral outlook, its dependence on material conditions, no more impugns our moral superiority
than Galileo's dependence on expensive new optical technology impugned the Copernican theory of the heavens."" Yet the Copernican
theory of the heavens (meaning, just to be clear, that the sun, not the
earth, is at the center of our solar system) has been so well confirmed,
so many ways, that it is no longer hostage to the peculiarities of any
particular scientific instrument, while the empirical evidence for the
vulnerability of moral judgment to "material conditions" (among other
factors) continues to multiply beyond even the obvious cases.2
The difficulties afflicting Rorty's position are on helpful display
in this passage from his Dewey Lecture:
Dewey and Kuhn tried to persuade us that criteria of relevance,
and thus of rationality, are social norms. Such norms have changed,
sometimes for the worse and sometimes for the better. They will
keep right on changing. But we shall never be able to prove that
any given change was a good or a bad one. To do so we would have
to find an Archimedean standpoint from which to compare our
sentences with the things that make them true or false.2
Norms of rationality and of justified belief- like the Scientific
Norm-may be social norms in the banal sense of being norms that
enjoy wide (or moderately) wide acceptance in society (or at least
elite sectors of society), but they are not "social norms" in the sense of
being norms whose prevalence is explicable solely in terms of sociological forces, as Rorty repeatedly (but without any evidence) suggests. Rorty may also be right that these norms "will keep right on
changing"-that is just to acknowledge fallibilism as all pragmatists
and empiricists do-but it is a non sequitur to conclude from fallibilism that we "shall never be able to prove that any given change was
a good or a bad one." Only if "prove" means "prove infallibly" would
22
The exceptions are familiar enough-from Lysenkoism to the biology of race-though
these cases stand discredited among scientists in a way in which racism, national chauvinism, and
sexism, among many other moral "ills," do not among educated elites in different countries.
2
Rorty, 74 U Chi L Rev at 920 (cited in note 1).
24
The classic contemporary study is Jonathan Haidt, Silvia Helena Koller, and Maria
G.

Dias, Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?, 65 J Personality & Soc Psych

613,625 (Oct 1993) (finding that wealthier individuals in the United States and Brazil were more
likely than poorer individuals to distinguish between harmful actions and harmless but "offensive" actions in making moral judgments), but examples could be multiplied.
2
Rorty, 74 U Chi L Rev at 926 (cited in note 1).
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this be true, but that is a standard of proof that plays no role, except
rhetorical, in human inquiries. We need no Archimedean standpoint to
conclude that moral inquiry is feeble in a way physics is not, we need
only take seriously our best current understanding of the world, how it
works, and the epistemic norms that have proven most effective in
making sense of it. Judge Posner, standing on the current planks in
Neurath's boat on which we all stand, observes that morality seems far
more dependent on time and place than physics, a highly plausible
causal/empirical hypothesis that could only be refuted by showing that
moral discourse really is as successful and really is as epistemically

credible by the standards those of us in the boat are employing. Perhaps we shall one day radically revamp the current planks in the boat
on which we currently stand as a matter of practice. Until that happens,
talk of "pragmatism" does no work as a response to moral skepticism.
If I am right, then perhaps there is only one plausible pragmatic
thesis that deserves notice in philosophy, and it is the one suggested by
the powerful metaphor of Neurath's boat. This thesis is, contra Rorty,
very much an epistemological thesis, that is, a thesis about the justification of what we ought to believe. And it says that justification can
not run all the way down, that it is grounded, unavoidably, in propositions (and practices) that we accept because they work, and not for
any other reason. But nothing in human experience or history gives us
any reason to think that the criterion of "what works" extends all the
way up the chain of justification. For it turns out that from human experience and human history, the practices "that work" are practices
whose criteria of belief and action have nothing to do with practical
considerations. And when we take those practices seriously, natural
science and morality seem to be very different indeed.

26

See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 59-63 (Belknap

1999) (distinguishing scientific from moral theory because science-in publicly dealing with
"what can be perceived"-has made predictions that have proven accurate, and inspires faith
and agreement on matters of practical, everyday reliance).
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